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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."' To ensure
this impartiality, the U.S. jury selection process allows two types of
challenges against prospective jurors: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges.
Challenges for cause are used to eliminate prospective jurors
from the jury panel for lack of impartiality.2 To successfully chal-
lenge a juror for cause, the party must state the specific reason for
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
** Barrister of the Middle Temple; Assistant Professor of Law and Resident Direc-
tor, Pepperdine University School of Law, London, England.
*** The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of their research assistants,
Jeff Cash and Lisa Daruty.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL THEORIES, TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES 272 (1991).
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the challenge, and the court must find the challenge warranted.3
In contrast, peremptory challenges give parties the right to
eliminate a limited number of jurors without stating a specific rea-
son.4 Although the U.S. Supreme Court once referred to the per-
emptory challenge as "'one of the most important"' rights in the
U.S. system of justice,5 the Court has more recently recognized the
potential for abusing the peremptory challenge.6 Accordingly, the
Court has proscribed the use of peremptory challenges for an im-
proper purpose, such as excluding jurors based on race 7 or gender.8
In his concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,9 U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall noted that "[t]he inherent po-
tential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by
permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally
lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice sys-
tem." °
Indeed, it is now evident that trial attorneys primarily use
peremptory challenges to "stack the deck" and seat a favorable,
rather than an impartial, jury. Attorneys exercise peremptory
challenges in order to "de-select" jurors who, while not biased, ap-
pear difficult to persuade. These peremptory challenges, which
are often based on ethnic, religious, cultural, or socioeconomic fac-
tors, reflect the prejudices and biases of the attorneys, the parties,
and often the costly jury consultants retained to assist in the jury
selection process. These prejudices and biases go largely un-
checked because attorneys are not required to justify a peremptory
challenge. For example, if the court required prosecutors to dis-
close that they routinely exercise peremptory challenges to ex-
clude young black males, but not all blacks, from jury panels be-
cause of their perception that young black males as a group are
sympathetic to criminal defendants, an uproar would undoubtedly
3. See id. at 273-74.
4. See id. at 279.
5. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396,408 (1894)), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
7. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
8. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127; see also discussion infra Part l.B.
9. 476 U.S. at 79.
10. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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ensue. Attorneys often exercise peremptory challenges based on
generalizations that few courts would permit if disclosure was nec-
essary.
This Article discusses the use of peremptory challenges in the
United States and proposes a more effective system of jury selec-
tion. Part II reviews some of the criticisms against peremptory
challenges. Part III examines the jury selection process in Eng-
land, where peremptory challenges were gradually abolished. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes a jury selection process that eliminates
peremptory challenges and relies entirely on challenges for cause
to guarantee an impartial jury.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: IMPEDIMENTS TO JUSTICE
Although nothing in the U.S. Constitution directly concerns
parties' rights to challenge jurors, the guarantee of a trial by an
impartial jury necessarily contemplates the need to strike jurors
who cannot act impartially. All parties have the right to challenge
an unlimited number of jurors for cause." Generally, challenges
for cause are based on actual or implied jury bias or prejudice or
on a lack of juror qualifications. 2 Although there is no limit to the
number of challenges for cause, courts are generally wary of
granting such challenges. 3 This wariness is largely a product of the
availability of peremptory challenges, which parties usually exer-
cise after they have exhausted all of their challenges for cause.14
Because an attorney who loses a challenge for cause may neverthe-
less peremptorily challenge the juror, judges are generally relieved
of their responsibility to make difficult decisions concerning a ju-
ror's bias or prejudice.
The constitutional guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury
11. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1995); United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1138
(9th Cir. 1996).
12. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 2, at 272. Actual bias or prejudice refers
to an expressed bias or prejudice, and implied bias refers to a bias that arises from a rela-
tionship between a juror and a party or witness. Lack of juror qualifications generally
refers to a juror's failure to meet standard criteria, such as citizenship, lack of a felony
criminal record, or absence of a physical or mental disability that would impede jury
service. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
13. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 2, at 274.
14. See id. at 275; see also discussion infra Part III.E.
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provides parties with the right to challenge jurors for cause, 5 but
not the right to peremptorily challenge jurors. 6 Peremptory chal-
lenges were used in colonial America as a part of English common
law. 17 Initially recognized as a trial right for criminal defendants in
serious cases,"8 the peremptory challenge is now generally avail-
able to both the prosecution and the defense. 9
Unlike challenges for cause, which must be based on logical
reasons why the potential juror is biased, prejudiced, or unquali-
fied to serve in a particular case, peremptory challenges are often
inspired by hunches, intuition, or "shots in the dark., 20 As a parti-
san, a lawyer uses peremptory challenges not to select an impartial
jury, but rather to select a jury that will be partial to his client's
cause.
Five main problems surround the use of peremptory chal-
lenges. First, attorneys who exercise peremptory challenges aim to
select a jury that is biased in favor of their client. This motive hin-
ders, rather than advances, the guarantee of a trial by an impartial
jury. Second, the exercise of. peremptory challenges is largely
based on the attorney's biases and prejudices toward persons of a
particular race, religion, gender, age, educational background, so-
cioeconomic status, and other associations. Such exercise has led
to discrimination against classes of potential jurors, which may
profoundly affect both parties' ability to obtain a trial by an im-
partial jury. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings
15. See Barnes v. State, 429 So. 2d 1114, 1120 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); cf. United
States v. Apodaca, 666 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1982).
16. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
219 (1965), overruled in part by Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
17. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 147 (1977). For a review of the historical
use of the peremptory challenge, as well as a federal district court judge's indictment of
the peremptory challenge, see Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge
Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 374-99 (1992). Ironically, England has abol-
ished peremptory challenges. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch.
9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (1790).
19. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (providing 20 peremptory challenges for each
side in capital cases, 10 peremptory challenges for the defense and 6 for the prosecution
in non-capital felony cases, and 3 peremptory challenges for each side in misdemeanor
cases).
20. See MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 55
(1978).
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in the past decade to curb the use of peremptory challenges as an
instrument of racial or gender discrimination, those rulings have
not had their anticipated effect.2' The third main problem with
peremptory challenges is that their availability has led to extensive
and intrusive voir dire examination of potential jurors, and thus,
increased the duration of jury trials. Fourth, the use of challenges
has raised the cost of jury trials due to the use of expensive jury
"experts" who assist attorneys in identifying jurors most likely to
favor one side or the other. Finally, the mere existence of peremp-
tory challenges permits the courts to avoid deciding whether a ju-
ror is truly biased or prejudiced because the attorney may still ex-
ercise a peremptory challenge if the judge denies a challenge for
cause.
A. Attorneys Use Peremptory Challenges in an Effort to Create a
Biased Jury
Although the constitutional guarantee of a trial by an impar-
tial jury remains the focus of challenges for cause, it is not the goal
of peremptory challenges. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron
White noted that the intended function of the peremptory chal-
lenge was "not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they. try
the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before
them, and not otherwise."22  In practice, however, peremptory
challenges allow attorneys to do what the Constitution could never
allow: to de-select jurors whom they perceive as unfavorable to
their client based on their biases and prejudices. Although attor-
neys initially used peremptory challenges as a shield against biased
jurors,23 such challenges are now used to shape a jury that is most
likely to engender bias in favor of the exercising attorney's client.
Although trial attorneys cherish peremptory challenges, em-
pirical evidence does not substantiate the argument that they are
necessary or useful in securing a fair trial. According to one Eng-
lish survey, when defense attorneys exercised their peremptory
strikes, the conviction rate was actually seven percent higher than
21. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
23. See id.
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when they did not do so.24 In another study involving twelve U.S.
federal criminal trials, the peremptorily excused jurors remained in
the courtroom as "shadow jurors." At the end of the trial, the
shadow jurors were also asked to vote on the case. They produced
essentially the same proportion of guilty votes as the actual jurors
in the case.26 The authors of the federal study concluded that the
overall performance of attorneys in striking biased potential jurors
was "not impressive. '
Peremptory challenges thus constitute a device that attorneys
use to achieve a biased jury rather than an impartial jury. In the
final analysis, however, the peremptory challenge does not even
appear to achieve the results hoped for by its staunchest defenders.
Accordingly. there is no reason to retain this device as a means of
guaranteeing a trial by a fair and impartial jury.
B. The Peremptory Challenge Has Become a Tool of
Discrimination
Even supporters of peremptory challenges recognize that such
challenges permit jurors to be eliminated for "imagined partial-
ity"" and that attorneys exercise these challenges with no basis in
fact.2 Former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger
acknowledged that an attorney's reasons for using peremptory
challenges are usually irrelevant to the subject matter of the court
action, but instead, are based on potential jurors' race, religion,
nationality, occupation, or other affiliations." Additionally, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that peremptory challenges
are usually based on "seat-of-the-pants instincts" that may be
"crudely stereotypical" and in many cases are "hopelessly mis-
24. See James J. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L.
REV. 528, 531.
25. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491,
492 (1978).
26. See id. at 513-18.
27. See id. at 517; sie also Rodger L. Hochman, Comment, Abolishing the Peremptory
Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1367, 1397-98 (1993).
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
29. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. See id: at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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taken."31
Some of the contradictory "advice" offered by trial attorneys,
including Clarence Darrow, on exercising peremptory challenges
reveals that such challenges are unsuitable as a tool of justice:
"Avoid all women in all defense cases," (Darrow); "Women are
sympathetic and extraordinarily conscientious," (Goldstein);
"Females are good for all defendants except attractive female
defendants," (Katz and Karcher). On emotionalism-
"Ethnically high to low, Irish, Jewish, Italian, French, Spanish,
and Slavic," (Goldstein); "Take smiling jurors, especially if they
smile at the attorney," (Darrow); "Be wary of smiling jurors
who are trying to disarm. attorneys," (Harrington & Dempsey);
"Presbyterians are too cold; Baptists are even less desir-
able... [K]eep Jews, Unitarians, Congregationalists, and ag-
nostics," (Darrow); "Information on religion is not usually help-
ful," (Appleman)
Interestingly, some jury experts and consultants have followed
such "seat-of-the-pants" advice that trial attorneys have offered.
For example, the social psychologists who conducted jury selection
research for the Harrisburg Seven defense eventually offered this
criterion: "Certain religious categories-e.g., Episcopalians, Pres-
byterians, Methodists, and fundamentalists-warranted exclusion
from the jury and Catholics, Brethren, and Lutherans warranted
inclusion."33 Following Darrow's "take smiling jurors" advice, an-
other jury expert has advised that a prospective juror "who leans
forward toward counsel, smiles and whose legs are not crossed is
suggesting that they [sic] are friendly and responsive to counsel's
questions."' 4 A psychologist compiling data from the Berrigan
Brothers and Vietnam Veterans Against the War trial concluded,
"Women in the North were more likely than men to be open-
minded toward the antiwar defendants, but in the South were less
31. Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. James Morton, Jury Selection, 137 NEW L.J. 561, 562 (1987); see also MELVIN M.
BELLI, SR., 3 MODERN TRIALS §§ 51.67-51.68 (2d ed. 1982) (stating that "a male juror is
more sound than a woman juror" and describing women as, among other things, "the se-
verest judges of their own sex" and "more acutely opinionated" than men).
33. Eugene I. Pavalon, Jury Selection Theories, TRIAL, June 1987, at 26, 29.
34. Ralph W. Gallagher, The Use of a Consultant in Voir Dire, TRIAL DIPL. J., Win-
ter 1984, at 24, 26.
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open-minded than men."3
While a person may not be offended to hear that attorneys
decide to accept or reject jurors merely because they smile
(depending upon whose hunch they choose to follow), it is both of-
fensive and violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection to exercise peremptory challenges solely based upon race6
or gender. 7 It is equally offensive, though it has not yet been held
to. violate the Constitution, to allow attorneys to exercise peremp-
tory challenges solely based upon ethnic origin, religion, or other
associations, which, in the absence of actual or implied bias, are ir-
relevant to the selection of an impartial jury.
In Batson v. Kentucky,38 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that the exercise of peremptory challenges against potential jurors
of the same racial group as the defendant may be constitutionally
infirm.3' Batson held that exercising peremptory challenges based
on race was a denial of the defendant's right to equal protection,
4
0
and therefore, unconstitutional. In Georgia v. McCollum, 41 the
Court held that racially based peremptory challenges by either the
defense or the prosecution violate the Constitution. While Batson
was chiefly concerned with the use of racially motivated challenges
as a violation of the defendant's equal protection rights, McCollum
focused on the right of potential jurors to racially neutral jury se-
lection procedures. 42 More recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B. , the Court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges
based solely upon gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.
44
Although the holding in J.E.B. is limited to gender-based discrimi-
nation, the Court has hinted that its holding may be extended to
35. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 83 (1986).
36. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
37. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,'511 U.S. 127 (1994).
38. 476 U.S. at 79.
39. See id. at 89.
40. See id. at 96-98.
41. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
42. See id. at 58-59.
43. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
44. See id. at 129. One Justice recognized that, even if there is support for the valid-
ity of stereotypes underlying gender-based peremptory challenges, the challenges remain
constitutionally infirm. See id. at 147-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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peremptory challenges based upon national origin and religion. 4
Under Batson, a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing: (1) the defendant is a member of a
cognizable racial group;46 (2) the group's members have been ex-
cluded from the defendant's jury;47 and (3) the circumstances sur-
rounding the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based
on race. 48  The prosecution must offer neutral, i.e., non-racially
45. See id. at 143.
46. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). Federal courts of appeals have
held that whites and American Indians constitute cognizable racial groups for Batson
purposes. See Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987) (whites); United
States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989) (American Indians); United
States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 795 (10th Cir. 1990) (American Indians). Federal courts
of appeals have held, however, that young adults and African-American males do not
constitute cognizable racial groups for Batson purposes. See United States v. Cresta, 825
F.2d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 1987) (young adults); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762
(7th Cir. 1993) (young adults); United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (young adults); United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (African-American males). Federal courts of appeals disagree whether
Italians constitute a cognizable racial group for Batson purposes. Compare United States
v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that Italian-Americans are not a
cognizable.group for Batson purposes), with United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d
Cir. 1988) (dictum) (holding that Italian-Americans are a cognizable racial group for Bat-
son purposes).
47. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
48. See id. Federal courts of appeals have found a prima facie case of discrimination
in some cases. See United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1991)
(prosecutor challenged four of seven minority member of venire and three of six minority
members of jury); Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1992) (prosecutor
asked only African-Americans whether race would influence decision); United States v.
Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor challenged all Hispanic jurors in
jury pool); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) (in the prosecution of a
Native American defendant, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike the
only Native American juror); see also United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination was not automatically
foreclosed even when members of the defendant's racial group were seated on the jury).
Federal courts of appeals have found no prima facie case of discrimination in other cases.
See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3d Cir. 1994) (prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude both Latin and non-Latin Spanish-speaking prospective jurors);
United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude one prospective African-American juror and one prospective Afri-
can-American alternate, but prosecutor accepted two African-American jurors while still
having peremptory challenges to strike them); United States v. Branch, 989 F.2d 752, 754-
55 (5th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude one of two Afri-
can-American prospective jurors and left the other on the jury panel); United States v.
Hatchett, 918 F.2d 631, 637 (6th Cir. 1990) (jury was 25% African-American and venire
was 20% African-American); United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (7th Cir.
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motivated, explanations for its peremptory challenges only after a
criminal defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful ra-
cial discrimination in the prosecution's exercise of peremptory
challenges.49
Although the Court has recognized that peremptory chal-
lenges may be used to unlawfully discriminate during the jury se-
lection process, Batson and its progeny offer little to stem the un-
lawful discrimination. A recent empirical study reveals that it is
relatively easy to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process, but that it is much more diffi-
cult to prevail on the challenge. 0 For example, while criminal de-
fendants are successful in establishing a prima facie Batson
violation 60.61% of the time, they ultimately succeed only 15.87%
of the time.51 Thus, it appears that Batson respondents usually suc-
ceed in providing a satisfactory neutral explanation for their per-
emptory challenges, even if the real motivation for exercising their
challenges is racially based.
1994) (prosecutor's challenges of two African-American venire members when four Afri-
can-Americans remained on jury after both parties exhausted peremptories and govern-
ment accepted several other African-American venire members stricken by defense);
United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1992) (prosecutor used only two of six
peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors and three African-Americans
remained on the jury after both parties exercised their challenges); United States v.
Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor used a peremptory challenge
to strike the only African-American potential juror when prosecutor's questions and
statements during jury selection failed to support inference of purposeful discrimination,
prosecutor's other peremptory challenges did not suggest general pattern of discrimina-
tion against racial minorities, and challenged juror was not treated differently than other
prospective jurors similar in relevant aspects except race); United States v. Hartsfield, 976
F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (jury ultimately selected contained five jurors having
Hispanic last names and two alternates having Hispanic first or last names); Tukes v.
Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 518 (11th Cir.*1990) (prosecutor exercised only one peremptory
challenge against an African-American juror, attempted to bring more African-
Americans onto jury by taking African-American venire members out of order, and
agreed not to use peremptory strike against additional African-American venire mem-
bers).
49. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
50. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460 (1996) (examining pub-
lished decisions of federal and state courts involving Batson challenges from April 30,
1986, the date that Batson was decided, through the end of 1993).
51. See id. Although prosecutors had a much higher success rate than defense attor-
neys in establishing a Batson prima facie case (100%) and ultimately prevailing on a Bat-
son challenge (84.62%), prosecutors made only 14 Batson challenges, while defense at-
torneys made 460 challenges. See id.
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In summary, courts have recognized that parties use peremp-
tory challenges as a tool for unlawful discrimination. Indeed, one
federal district court judge recently barred the use of peremptory
challenges in her courtroom as "an obvious corruption of the judi-
cial process., 52 Unfortunately, their use continues, and current at-
tempts to correct this problem are far from ideal. Despite the time
and scarce resources expended after jury selection to determine
whether unlawful discrimination has infected the jury selection
process, courts often do not find impermissible discrimination.
When a court does find a Batson violation, voir dire must begin
anew, consuming more time and resources. As one jurist has
noted, because a prima facie Batson violation may be defeated
fairly easily by a neutral, i.e., non-racially motivated, explanation
for challenging the juror, "Batson and its progeny have proven to
be less an obstacle to discrimination than a roadmap to it.
53
Rather than attempting-at the expense of time and scarce re-
sources-to ferret out unlawful discrimination in the use of per-
emptory challenges, it would be more efficient and consistent to
eliminate them. Elimination of peremptory challenges would be
the best way to ensure that racial, gender, or other offensive forms
of discrimination do not infect the U.S. jury selection process.
C. Peremptory Challenges Waste Too Much Time
The constitutional guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury re-
quires an individual examination of potential jurors in order to
identify and purge jurors warranting a challenge for cause. Voir
dire is essential to this process. When aimed at discovering
grounds on which to challenge jurors for cause, voir dire is usually
relatively brief and primarily case-specific. When attempting to
formulate "hunches" upon which peremptory challenges will be
based, however, attorneys often require potential jurors to endure
lengthy and wide-ranging voir dire examination.
An extreme example of lengthy voir dire driven by the avail-
ability of peremptory challenges took place in People v. Simpson.
4
The jury selection process in Simpson lasted several months.5 The
52. Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
53. People v. Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
54. No. BA097211, 1994 WL 521797 (Super. Ct., L.A. County Sept. 26, 1994).
55. Jury selection began in September 1994 and concluded in December 1994.
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jurors initially had to complete a seventy-nine page questionnaire
containing 294 written questions.5 6 The questions included inquiry
into the juror's favorite subject in school (question 39);57 the name
of a person whom the juror greatly admired and the reason why
(question 145); 5" religious affiliation and frequency of worship
(question 201);59 book preferences (question 244);61 leisure time in-
terests, hobbies, and activities (question 252);61 and whether the ju-
ror voted in the 1994 primary election (question number 204).62
Of course, answers to these and other questions give attorneys
more information about the individual juror. Use of this informa-
tion in deciding against whom to exercise peremptory challenges,
however, depends upon each attorney's biases and prejudices.
Thus, it is not uncommon for attorneys to use the same informa-
tion to support differing, even opposite, conclusions. For example,
the lead, prosecutor in the Simpson case, which involved issues of
domestic violence, apparently concluded that black females who
had experienced domestic violence would be favorable to the
prosecution.63 She assumed that they would be fed up with do-
mestic violence and would therefore identify with the victim.64 A
jury consultant in the same case arrived at the opposite conclusion
and decided that black females who had been exposed to domestic
violence would feel that it was "not a big deal" and would be more
forgiving toward the defendant.65
In light of the research showing that attorneys are not particu-
larly effective in exercising peremptory challenges, it is not surpris-
ing that different people arrive at opposite predictions of juror be-
havior based upon the same information. It is very difficult to
justify, however, retaining a system that expends a considerable
56. See ROBERT J. WALTON & F. LAGARD SMITH, TRIAL OF THE CENTURY: YOU
BE THE JUROR 15 (1994).
57. See id. at 18.
58. See id. at 23.
59. See id. at 27-28.
60. See id. at 30.
61. See id. at 31.
62. See id. at 28.
63. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. GOT AWAY
WITH MURDER 94 (1996).
64. See id.
65. See id.
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amount of time prying into the private lives and innermost feelings
of jurors merely so that attorneys can use-or misuse-the informa-
tion in exercising peremptory challenges. If peremptory chal-
lenges were eliminated, voir dire could be streamlined to focus
only on the discovery of jurors' actual bias or prejudice toward the
parties.
D. Peremptory Challenges Contribute to the Increasing Cost of
Litigation
Both the significant expenditure of time in gathering infor-
mation upon which attorneys will base their peremptory chal-
lenges and the preparation for the exercise of such challenges in-
crease litigation costs. One obvious cost, which both litigants
represented by retained counsel and taxpayers bear, is the attor-
ney's hourly fee.
In recent years, trial attorneys have routinely employed "jury
experts." One service that jury experts offer is advice on jury se-
lection. The prosecution's jury expert in Simpson conducted sev-
eral fifteen-person "focus group" sessions to "put some meat and
flesh on statistics" to be used in jury selection.66 The jury expert in
Simpson donated services to the prosecution; usually, however, the
litigants bear this substantial cost. In addition, litigants must pay
the daily $50 fee of each "focus group" member 67 and the addi-
tional fees of experts who compile and interpret the results. It is
not uncommon, therefore, for jury expert fees to reach thousand of
dollars simply for jury selection.
There is no empirical evidence that reveals whether attorneys
who use jury experts are more successful than unaided attorneys in
exercising peremptory challenges. Notably, however, the lead de-
fense trial counsel in Simpson credited his jury expert for the suc-
cessful verdict in that case." It is perverse that the U.S. system of
justice, which elevates a trial by an impartial jury to a constitu-
tional right, now encourages attorneys to employ costly jury ex-
perts in an attempt to "stack the deck" with jurors who are fa-
vorably disposed toward their clients.69  The elimination of
66. See id.
67. See id. at 96.
68. See id. at 95.
69. We recognize that jury consultants offer many valuable services to trial attorneys,
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peremptory challenges would further the interests of justice by re-
focusing jury selection on challenges for cause and reducing the
cost of jury selection.
E. The Existence of Peremptory Challenges Permits Judges to
Abdicate Their Responsibility in Striking Jurors for Cause
Judges are generally very reluctant to grant challenges for
cause.70  Trial judges know that they do not need to make the
tough judgment call on whether a juror is actually biased because
an attorney unhappy with the ruling on a challenge for cause can
subsequently exercise a peremptory challenge to strike the juror.
Thus, attorneys do not strenuously argue their challenges for
cause, and judges do not carefully scrutinize the challenges to de-
termine whether cause actually exists. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is
effectively unreviewable,1 giving trial judges additional comfort in
the knowledge that their decisions, even if erroneous, cannot be
reversed.
Eliminating peremptory challenges would still leave attorneys
the challenge for cause as a tool for impaneling an impartial jury.
Clearly, eliminating peremptory challenges would have the added
benefit of forcing judges to actually determine the existence of bias
for which jurors should be stricken, while minimizing the striking
of jurors merely based on racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and
other stereotypes.
III. THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF JURY SELECTION
[A] system of peremptory challenge is being used to introduce a
bias, but a bias towards acquittal. That may be fair to defen-
dants who may be guilty but want to be acquitted, but it is not
fair to the general public who want to be protected against vi-
71cious and violent crime.
Although this quotation mirrors some of the current concerns sur-
including advice on how to present evidence most effectively.
70. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 2, at 274.
71. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81,88 (1988).
72. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 986 (Mar. 31, 1987). Luke Hansard and his family
printed the Official Report of Parliamentary Debates for the British Houses of Parlia-
ment from 1774-1892-the equivalent of the Congressional Record in the United States-
and the official report of proceedings and debates is now known by this name.
[Vol. 19:507
Cause vs. Peremptory Challenges
rounding the debate on jury reform in the United States, it comes
from a debate that took place in England almost ten years ago,
which led to the abolition of peremptory challenges.73 The history
of peremptory challenges reflects a balancing act between the
prosecution and the accused that parallels the development of the
jury system in England.
Currently in England, the defendant does not have a right to
peremptory challenges, and challenges for cause are rare because
barristers may obtain only limited information on potential ju-
rors.74 The prosecution has a limited right to "stand by" for the
Crown75 and may challenge for cause on the same basis as the de-
fense. Therefore, voir dire does not exist in England's legal sys-
tem.
This Part of the Article reviews the historical development of
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause in England. It
then details the fierce debate that surrounded the government's
decision to abolish the use of peremptory challenges. Finally, this
Part discusses the consequences and conclusions that one may
draw from the current English system of jury selection.
A. Historical Development
At the beginning of the twelfth century, a "presenting" or
grand jury would indict an accused individual.76 The presenting
jury would decide which mode of proof the accused could use to
defend.himself.77 At the time, the defendant's choices were com-
78 89purgation,78 ordeal,79 jury," or battle.81
73. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 (Eng.).
74. Only the jurors' names and addresses are available. See MICHAEL ZANDER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 222 (1993).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 91,154-154.
76. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution currently requires grand jury in-
dictments for major crimes. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although this requirement has
never been applicable to the individual states, most states have grand juries. Interest-
ingly, the grand jury no longer exists in England. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625 (1972).
77. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (7th ed. 3d
prtg. 1982).
78. The accused would follow a set form of words to take an oath denying the
charges. See id. at 305. If the accused could not get compurgators to back his denial un-
der oath, the oath would "burst" and he would lose. See id.
79. Trial by ordeal was based on the belief that God would intervene to show who
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After compurgation was discredited as a means of proving in-
nocence82 and trial by ordeal was abolished,83 the petty jury
evolved as the method for determining guilt or innocence. In most
cases, members of the presenting jury that returned the indict-
ment, or indictors, also had to sit on the petty jury and determine
the accused's guilt or innocence. As a result, a guilty verdict was
virtually guaranteed, although there were occasional exceptions.8
Additionally, judges were free to determine what portion of the
petty jury would be composed of members of the presenting jury.
85
Gradually, conflict evolved between the accused and the
Crown regarding jury composition. People soon recognized that it
was unfair to have a member of the presenting jury or a personal
enemy of the accused on the petty jury. In 1302, an accused knight
could successfully dismiss from his jury both members who had
comprised the original presenting jury and members who were not
knights on the ground that they were not his peers.8' He could also
object to individual knights once they were called. 87
The Crown, which desired convictions and thus favored in-
cluding members of the presenting jury on the petty jury, con-
tested this early form of challenges to juror members. In 1340,
Justice Parning warned that "if indictors be not there it is not well
for the king.
88s
had right on his or her side. See id. at 310. Examples of trial by ordeal include carrying a
red hot iron, surviving a fire, or placing a hand or arm in boiling water. See id.
80. Trial by jury was available only upon payment and only when a private person
accused the defendant of the crime. See LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS,
PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 51 (2d ed. 1988).
81. The option of battle was available only when a private person accused the defen-
dant of a crime, because the defendant clearly could not do battle with the Crown; how-
ever, there were exceptions. See id. In 1226, an old woman accused of a serious crime
was excused from battle due to her physical condition, and instead, was granted a jury
trial. See id.
82. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 323.
83. The Lateran Council abolished trial by ordeal in 1215. See MOORE, supra note
80, at 50.
84. See id. The view was that if members of the petty jury who were on the present-
ing jury found the accused not guilty, they had contradicted themselves and should be
punished by fine or imprisonment. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 324.
88. Id. at 325.
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Despite Parning's exhortation, resentment against the inclu-
sion of indictors on the jury grew such that, by 1351-1352, no in-
dictor could sit on the jury if the accused "challenged [him] for this
cause."8 9 The petty jury thereby extracted itself completely from
the grand or presenting jury, a form that is recognized today in the
U.S. grand and petit jury systems.
Nevertheless, agents of the Crown continued to choose the
panel from which the jury was selected. Where death was a possi-
ble penalty, the Crown permitted the accused to challenge thirty-
five jurors for any reason; however, the Crown itself had an unlim-
ited number of challenges. This favoritism to the Crown ended in
1305,90 and henceforth, the Crown could only challenge for cause.
This advantage for the accused was fleeting and was soon neutral-
ized, however, because the prosecution developed the technique of
"standing by" for the Crown that is still used today. While a jury is
being impaneled, the prosecutor may ask a juror or jurors to
"stand by" and wait until the rest of the panel has been called.
"Standing by" differs from peremptory challenges by the defense
in that, if all of the potential jurors are eliminated, the Crown must
draw from the "stand by" jurors to complete the jury selection or
show cause to dismiss them. 9'
The number of permissible peremptory challenges by the de-
fense was reduced to twenty by 1509 and then to seven in 1948.92
The Criminal Law Act 19779' further reduced the number of per-
missible peremptory challenges to three.94 As this ancient right
diminished over the years, it was balanced with new rights to pro-
vide the defendant with the opportunity for a fair and just trial.95
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. In 1870, the courts determined that the panel of jurors could include every juror
in the building, including jurors on other cases, so it would be a rare case indeed that
would require the prosecution to show cause. See THE JURY UNDER ATFACK 147 (Mark
Findlay & Peter Duff eds., 1988); see also infra text accompanying notes 153-154.
92. See THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 91, at 146.
93. Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 45, § 43 (Eng.).
94. See id. § 43.
95. Early rules weighing against the accused that were abolished included: (1) Jurors
could not eat, drink, or separate from each other until they had given their verdict, see 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 318-19, (2) Until Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006
(C.P. 1670), the jury could be punished for reaching a verdict contrary to the direction of
the court or the evidence, see Gobert, supra note 24, at 531; (3) The accused could not call
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B. The Debate to Abolish Peremptory Challenges
The debate to abolish peremptory challenges arose as a result
of a lead article in the London newspaper, The Times, that con-
demned their use.96 Toby Jessel, a member of the British Parlia-
ment, seized upon the article and used it during the traditional de-
bate that followed the Queen's Speech." Jessel noted:
[Tihere is one serious gap in this important part [on law and
order] of the Gracious Speech-there is no mention of the
growing and systematic abuse of the right to challenge jury-men
and women. Trial by jury in criminal courts is now being dis-
rupted so that there are far too many acquittals. This is un-
dermining the work of the police in the promotion of law and
order. The Government and Parliament must grasp this nettle,
and grasp it soon.98
Reading from The Times, he continued:
A pin-striped suit, an old school or regimental tie, a
prominently displayed copy of the Daily Telegraph seem to
provide a virtual guarantee that the bearer will be excluded
from the jury...
Today peremptory challenge seems to be used by defence
counsel in an endeavour to achieve as far as possible a jury
composed of people believed by the defence to be likely to be
hostile to the prosecution and sympathetic to the defendant.
[Tihe right to peremptory challenge... ought now to be
abolished.99
The next day, Jessel pressed the new Home Secretary, Doug-
las Hurd, M.P., to comment on the belief that abuse-of peremptory
challenges was handicapping police efforts to prevent and deter
crime. 00 Hurd was also under considerable pressure from Opposi-
witnesses, but the Crown could, and the accused could not have an attorney, see MOORE,
supra note 80, at 55.
96. Editorial, No Challenge, TIMES (London), June 13, 1985, at 11.
97. The Prime Minister actually writes this annual address, which the Queen reads
during the opening of Parliament. It sets forth the government's agenda for the year,
similar to the U.S. President's State of the Union Address.
98. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 91 (Nov. 6,1985) (statement of Toby Jessel).
99. Id. (statement of Toby Jessel).
100. See HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 130 (Nov. 7, 1985) (statement of Toby Jessel).
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tion Party members who were using mounting crime statistics to
criticize the government's record on law and order.'0 ' Hurd re-
sponded that the Attorney-General was arranging for the new
Crown Prosecution Service to conduct a survey "so that we have a
basis of fact upon which we can consider whether action is
needed."1
2
Two months after the debate on peremptory challenges, the
Fraud Trials Committee, chaired by Lord Roskill, published its re-
port,' 3 which included a chapter on jury composition. The Com-
mittee concluded that peremptory challenges were weakening the
principle of random selection, which was already eroding due to
exclusions and releases." 4 In the Committee's view, "the public,
press, and many legal practitioners now believe that this ancient
right is abused cynically and systematically to manipulate cases
toward a desired result."'0 5
The Committee proceeded to recommend, with one dissent-
ing opinion,"'6 that the right of peremptory challenge and the
prosecution's right to "stand by" for the Crown should be abol-
ished in any fraud case.0 7 Although the Committee retained the
challenge for cause according to existing principles, it suggested
that the validity of the challenge might be determined in the
judge's chambers to avoid possible embarrassment to the juror in
question." 8 To assist attorneys seeking to make valid challenges
for cause, the Committee recommended the disclosure of jurors'
occupations.' 9
101. See id. (statement of Douglas Hurd).
102. Id. (statement of Douglas Hurd).
103. FRAUD TRIALS COMMITTEE REPORT, 1986, Cmnd. 1522.
104. See id. 1 7.37.
105. Id.
106. Walter Merricks, a defense solicitor, argued to wait for the Crown Prosecution
Service study that the government had commissioned. See supra text accompanying note
102. He opposed abolishing the right of peremptory challenge. "While difficult to defend
on strict logic, it was but one feature of a complex and not wholly logical system in which
the checks and balances had evolved over a long period, and should be disturbed only af-
ter a wide-ranging examination of the consequences." FRAUD TRIALS COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 103, 1 B4.
107. See FRAUD TRIALS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 103, 1 7.38.
108. See id.
109. See id. In England, it is practice to give only the names and addresses of jurors.
See supra note 74.
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Two months after the Fraud Trials Committee Report, the
government published its White Paper"' on Criminal Justice."'
The Paper stated that the traditional rationale for the peremptory
challenge was to "enable the defendant to have confidence in the
jury even where he could not assign specific reasons for his objec-
tion.' ' 12 It also noted the potential advantages of the peremptory
challenge: "Sometimes it may be merely a substitute for a chal-
lenge for cause, saving time and perhaps avoiding embarrassment,
in cases where cause could quite readily be shown.""' 3 Further, the
Paper acknowledged that the peremptory challenge could be an'
effective tool in "adjust[ing] the composition of a jury in terms of
age, sex or race, in a way thought to secure the defendant a better
chance of a fair hearing" and to remove a juror with a suspected
bias against the defendant."
4
Giving rise to concern, however, was the peremptory chal-
lenge's primary use "as a means of getting rid of jurors whose mere
appearance [was] thought to indicate a degree of insight or respect
for the law [that was] inimical to the interests of the defence" and
its use in multi-defendant cases in which it appeared that defen-
dants were pooling their challenges to replace entire juries."5 The
Paper condemned this action as contrary to the interests of justice
and offensive to the individual juror and recommended that any
forthcoming bills should abolish peremptory challenges."1
6
110. A Command Paper, which Her Majesty's Command theoretically presents, is a
government publication for the Parliament's consideration. Each Command Paper is dis-
tinguished by the color in which it is bound: a white paper contains statements of gov-
ernment policy to be introduced, a green paper represents government plans intended for
discussion, and a blue book contains reports of committees or commissions. See Marilyn
J. Berger, A Comparative Study of British Barristers and American Legal Practice and
Education, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 540, 542 n.13 (1983).
111. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLANS FOR LEGISLATION, 1986, Cmnd. 9658.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 15.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Other possibilities included reducing the number of peremptory challenges from
three to two or one, which would reduce a defendant's chances of blocking a majority
verdict, and limiting peremptory challenges in multi-defendant cases. See Criminal Jus-
tice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § 17 (Eng.). Where defendants did not pool their challenges, how-
ever, there was concern that the reduction of peremptory challenges would curtail an in-
dividual defendant's rights. See id.
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To the government's acute embarrassment, the much-awaited
Crown Prosecution Service survey' 17 did not provide the antici-
pated results. During the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill,
Chris Smith, a Labour Party member of Parliament, was able to
use the survey results to great effect against the government: "The
evidence does not substantiate the case that peremptory challenge
gives a substantial tilt in favour of the defendant."' 18 The results
revealed that in both single-defendant and multi-defendant trials,
the use of challenges could not be linked to a lower likelihood of
conviction. " 9 In fact, higher conviction rates resulted when per-
emptory challenges were used (60%) than when they were not
used (53%)."0 Smith concluded, "The evidence of the survey is
absolutely crystal clear. There is no tilt in favour of the defendant
where peremptory challenge is exercised.,
12 1
117. See supra text accompanying note 102.
118. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 973 (Mar. 31,1987) (statement of Chris Smith).
119. See id. (statement of Chris Smith).
120. See id. (statement of Chris Smith).
121. Id. (statement of Chris Smith). The survey results also showed that there was a
considerable difference in the use of peremptory challenges in trials in London as op-
posed to other parts of the country: the rate was three times higher in inner London than
in metropolitan counties. See Julie Vennard & David Riley, The Use of Peremptory
Challenge and Stand By of Jurors and Their Relationship to Final Outcome, 1988 CRIM. L.
REV. 731, 735. The peremptory challenge was used almost twice as often in multi-
defendant cases than in single-defendant cases, but there was no evidence of the wide-
spread pooling of challenges in multi-defendant cases that had come under so much criti-
cism. See id. The higher rates of challenges in London both for single and multi-
defendant cases might have reinforced the perception of widespread abuse.
PERCENTAGE OF TRIALS INVOLVING ONE OR MORE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Crown Prosecution Service Single-defendant trials Multi-defendant trials
Region
Inner London 32% 47%
Metropolitan Counties .10% 16%
See id. tbl. 1.
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES USED PER DEFENDANT
Number of Peremptory Challenges Per Defendant
Defendants 0 >0 to 1 >1 to <3 3 (maximum)
1 80% 8% 6% 6%
2 71% 18% 10% 1%
3 62% 23% 14% 1%
4 or more 46% 46% 8% 0%
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In response to Smith's statistics, Hurd observed that the sta-
tistics did not actually reveal anything about the effects of the per-
emptory challenge because the survey did not include information
about the nature of the cases where the peremptory challenge was
used." For example, if peremptory challenges were used because
the defendant's case was fairly hopeless, this use would corrupt the
statistics.' 23 Hurd's tongue-in-cheek confession that he had "come
to understand the deep affection in which peremptory challenge
was held" was followed with the emphatic observation that he did
"not mean that it [was] held in affection by the public [but by] the
practitioners in the courts [and in the Commons who were] ad-
vanc[ing] the case again [that] evening.',
2 4
One such individual, Nicholas Budgen, M.P., a Conservative
Party member and criminal barrister, recalled standing in the rob-
ing room'25 at a quarter to ten in the morning and saying to fellow
barristers, "Right-ho chaps, let's get on with rigging the jury. We
shall object to anybody who gets into the jury box wearing a suit or
who is seen near the Financial Times or The Daily Telegraph."'26
This comment did nothing to assuage fears that defense counsel
See id. at 736 tbl. 3.
Briefly, where there was one defendant, peremptory challenges were used 20% of the
time. See id. Where there were four or more defendants, peremptory challenges were
used 54% of the time. See id.
122. See HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 996 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Douglas Hurd).
123. 1 have never based the case on statistics or on anecdote. I have based the case on
what I believe to be principles of logic and common sense.
We used to have 35 peremptory challenges. Then it was reduced to seven. No
doubt, the profession was keen that nothing should be done and thought that
there was magic in the word "seven," yet it was reduced to three. Obviously,
through the years Parliament has believed that, as the system as a whole be-
comes fairer to the defendant, this tilt in favour of the defendant is no longer
necessary. We propose a strengthening of the jury system. This is a strengthen-
ing of the random principle which lies at the heart of the jury system. It is the
slow, organic conclusion of a process which has been going on for a long time.
Id. cols. 996-999 (statement of Douglas Hurd).
124. Id. cols. 994-995 (statement of Douglas Hurd). Membership in the House of
Commons is not necessarily a full-time job. Many members are also practising barristers.
125. Barristers' court attire consists of a wing collar, bands, a wig, and a gown, and
thus, a robing room is an essential feature of any court where robes are required.
126. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 983 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Nicholas Budgen).
Lord Mansfield recounted his own practice as a defence barrister of challenging to get
onto the jury "'a layabout lot of unemployed males."' Sean Enright, Reviving the Chal-
lenge for Cause, 139 NEw L.J. 9 (1989).
528
Cause vs. Peremptory Challenges
were wrongly interfering with the random nature of juries and
manipulating the system to secure acquittal. Budgen proceeded to
conclude, "[This system] does not work. While at the age of
[twenty-eight] I used to think it was all a tremendously clever and
logical wheeze, now as an unsuccessful middle-aged man I bow be-
fore the mystery of the jury system."
12
The failure of the Crown Prosecution Service survey to iden-
tify any link between the use of peremptory challenges and acquit-
tal rates appeared to back the "mystery of the jury system" con-
clusion. Supporters of the peremptory challenge still felt,
however, that if the outcome was indeed "hit-or-miss," the per-
emptory challenge should be maintained so that the defendant
would at least perceive the process as fair.
Regardless of whether the peremptory challenge actually re-
sulted in acquittal, a second argument against it was that it dero-
gated from the principle that jury selection should be random.
During the parliamentary debate, Jessel quoted from Gilbert and
Sullivan's Trial by Jury"' to colorfully express his belief that twelve
individuals could be randomly selected and rise to the challenge of
unbiased verdicts.1 29 In Jessel's view, a barrister.., has no need to
rely solely on his power of oration, his forensic skill or his legal
knowledge. He has a fourth weapon-[the ability] to tamper with
the composition of the jury."'3 ° Jessel concluded, "Trial by jury in
127. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 983 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Nicholas Budgen).
128. GILBERT & SULLIVAN, TRIAL BY JURY, reprinted in A TREASURY OF GIILBERT
& SULLIVAN (1941).
129. [Tlhe usher enjoining the jury to be free from bias .... sings:
"With stern judicial frame of mind
From bias free of every kind,
This trial must be tried."
The verse begins:
"Now, Jurymen, hear my advice-
All kinds of vulgar prejudice
I pray you set aside .... "
A little later the judge speaks of his early career at the Bar and sings:
"All thieves who could my fees afford
Relied on my orations
And many a burglar I've restored
To his friends and his relations."
HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 984 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Toby Jessel).
130. Id. cols. 984-985 (statement of Toby Jessel).
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Crown courts has become distorted.' 31
The subsequent debate centered around the infamous Cyprus
Spy Trial.132  Alex Carlile, M.P., rose to his feet and demanded,
"[W]hat is the Hon. Gentleman's evidence that trials have become
distorted as a result of the use of peremptory challenge? I defy
him to produce any evidence.' ' 3   With a flourish, Jessel rose to
produce such evidence. He had obtained a copy of an account of a
meeting that had taken place among counsel before the Cyprus
Spy Trial and read it. It revealed exactly what opponents of per-
emptory challenges had argued: defense counsel were pooling
their peremptory challenges in order to manipulate the composi-
tion of the jury in hopes of securing an acquittal.
35
The Speaker of the House intervened to quell the ensuing up-
roar that followed the reading of the revealing document: "Order.
The Hon. Gentlemen, who are distinguished barristers, would not
get away with this sort of behaviour in court.' ' 36 When Jessel re-
gained the floor, he continued by stating:
Juries are supposed to be selected at random. The right of
challenge existed to try to have an unbiased jury so that, if a ju-
ryman was thought to be biased, the defendant could remove
that juryman. Now, a system of peremptory challenge is being
used to introduce a bias, but a bias towards acquittal. That may
be fair to defendants who may be guilty but want to be acquit-
131. Id. col. 985 (statement of Toby Jessel).
132. Defense barristers challenged seven jurors, and it was believed that the barristers
had acted together in pooling their peremptory challenges. See Enright, supra note 126,
at 90. An outcry ensued when the jury, all young and male, acquitted all seven defen-
dants. See id
133. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 985 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Alex Carlile).
134. Robin Simpson's point was that we wanted a young, working-class jury. Michael
Hill made the comment that he really wanted an anti-establishment jury and that we were
better off to have a young middle-age middle-class jury. Robert Harman pointed out that
there was a dichotomy of views that we will just take what we get. John Alliot's view was
that we couldn't improve on fate. Gilbert Gray indicated that if the jury is not too well
educated and is of too low an intelligence, they may take more note of the Judge and
therefore we ought to go for people who were young, not unsmart but no women. Victor
Durand chimed in by saying that if the jury were young they may be unpatriotic. John
Alliott indicated that we ought to pool resources as far as any challenges were concerned
that Michael Hill pointed out that we ought to challenge one, two, three, by one counsel
and so on with another Counsel [sic] until we achieved a joint policy.
Id. (statement of Toby Jessel).
135. See id. (statement of Toby Jessel).
136. Id. col. 986 (statement of the Speaker of the House).
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ted, but it is not fair to the general public who want to be pro-
tected against vicious and violent crime.
37
Parliament approved the Criminal Justice Bill of 1988,138
which contained the provision abolishing peremptory challenges, 9
and it became law on January 5, 1989.
C. Challenges for Cause
The debate on the Criminal Justice Bill raised concerns about
the effect on jury selection of the abolition of peremptory chal-
lenges. Carlile predicted, "If we remove the right of peremptory
challenge so that all jury challenges by the defence have to be
challenges for cause, we shall open up a hornet's nest of practical
problems that will beset the courts for years to come."' ° He also
feared that, if Parliament eliminated the peremptory challenge,
"[the] very American system which [we] dread so much will de-
velop.' 14' Ivan Lawrence cautioned against abolishing peremptory
challenges if the result would be lengthy challenges for cause or
"tailoring a jury [as] in the United States."' 42 Jury selection in
England usually startles visiting U.S. attorneys because it takes
only a matter of minutes. Challenges for cause may be made ei-
ther "to the array or the polls for some definite reason assigned
and proved.' ' 43 A challenge to the array, though rare, occurs when
137. Id. (statement of Toby Jessel).
138. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 (Eng.).
139. See id. § 118.
140. HANSARDS, H.C. DEB. col. 979 (Mar. 31, 1987) (statement of Alex Carlile).
141. Id. col. 980 (statement of Alex Carlile).
142. Id. col. 993(statement of Ivan Lawrence).
Tailoring a jury is what they do in the United States. Tailoring a jury is
when a juryman is asked to stand up and say where he lives, how old he is, where
he worships, what he thinks about blacks and young people. That is what goes
on in American courts, and as a result it takes a day or two to choose a jury. It
takes five minutes in an English court. More time can be spent tailoring a jury
when jurors can be challenged for cause than trying a case.
If our trials, instead of lasting one, two or three days, start lasting one, two
or three weeks because we have challenges for cause instead of the three per-
emptory challenges, where have we gained? Where will our system of justice be
if cases come on more slowly because the queue is even longer?
Id. Ironically, peremptory challenges, rather than challenges for cause, "tailor" juries in
the United States.
143. ARCHBOLD: PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACrICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 4-152
(Stephen Mitchell & P.J. Richardson eds., 43d ed. 1988); see also Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23,
§ 12 (Eng.).
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a barrister takes exception to the entire jury impaneled "on the
ground that the person responsible for summoning the jurors in
question is biased or had acted improperly." '44 In contrast, a chal-
lenge to the polls is a challenge to individual jurymen.' 4 A chal-
lenge to the polls may be made on statutory grounds, such as in-
eligibility or disqualification, or on common law grounds.
There are four common law grounds that are still known by
their Latin titles: (1) propter honoris respectum, a challenge on the
ground that "a peer or lord of parliament is sworn on a jury for the
trial of a commoner"; (2) propter defectum, a challenge on the
ground that an individual lacks the requisite qualification; (3)
propter delictum, a challenge "on the ground of infamy" or past
criminal conviction; and (4) propter affectum, a challenge "on the
ground of some presumed or actual partiality."146
The first three common law grounds are also statutory
grounds for a challenge. The fourth, propter affectum, deals with
the complex issue of bias. Richard Buxton defines bias in this con-
text as "whether the individual juror will be able to, and will, be
loyal to his oath to give a true verdict according to the evidence."'147
Buxton classifies bias into three headings: (1) connection with the
case or the parties, (2) knowledge of the accused's character, and
(3) general hostility.'" If there is either a connection or knowl-
edge, bias is essentially assumed; however, if there is hostility, bias
is not assumed, but must be established. 49
Before defense counsel may cross-examine a juror about pos-
sible bias, he must lay a foundation of fact showing a prima facie
case in support of his challenge.5 ° The only information known
about the juror, however, is his or her name and address.' Be-
cause it is extremely difficult to make a successful challenge for
cause on the basis of such meager information, such challenges are
144. Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23, § 12(6) (Eng.); see also ARCHBOLD, supra note 143, § 4-
151.
145. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 143, § 4-151.
146. See id. §§ 4-160 to 4-161.
147. Richard Buxton, Challenging and Discharging Jurors, 1990 CRIM. L. REv. 225,
229-30.
148. See id. at 230-32.
149. See id.
150. See R. v. Chandler, 48 Crim. App. 143 (1964) (Eng.).
151. See supra note 74.
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rarely used in English courts. Examples abound of judges who
have never seen a challenge for cause and counsel who have only
rarely witnessed it.'52
The prosecution still has the right to "stand by" for the Crown
even though the Fraud Trials Committee recommended that it be
abolished along with the right of peremptory challenge.'53 The
"stand by," though technically a challenge for cause, is really both
a challenge for cause and a peremptory challenge.'A If the prose-
cution asks a potential juror to "stand by," the juror is effectively
off the jury. It is only when there are no more jurors from which
to select that the prosecution must evaluate the jurors standing by
and either show cause or accept them onto the jury.
In its 1988 guidelines, the Attorney General addressed the
imbalance created by preserving the prosecution's right to "stand
by" while abolishing the defense's right to peremptory challenge.
The guidelines indicated that the right to "stand by" should be
used "only sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. It is gen-
erally accepted that the prosecution should not use its right in or-
der to influence the overall composition of a jury or with a view to
tactical advantage."' 55  The guidelines also provided that "the
Crown should assert its right to stand by only on the basis of
clearly defined and restrictive criteria,"'56 but that it would be
proper for the Crown to exercise its right in connection with jury
vetting5 7 or where a juror is "manifestly unsuitable and the de-
152. One experienced barrister could recall only two cases:
The first was in the film, Brothers in Law, when Ian Carmichael successfully
challenges a juror on the grounds that she is his mother. The second was a case
at the Old Bailey [the Central London Criminal Court] when a barrister said to
his co-defender that he must challenge a juror on. the grounds that he had been
to bed with her. The second barrister looked up and said "I'll do it for you: so
have I." And if that sounds apocryphal, it took place in Court 6 at the Old Bai-
ley and for a suitable donation I will disclose the names of the barristers.
Morton, supra note 32, at 561.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
154. Beginning in 1305, the prosecution could no longer use the peremptory challenge,
but the prosecution used the challenge for cause almost to the same effect. See 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 325.
155. Juries: Guidelines on Prosecution's Right of Stand-by and Jury Checks, 138 NEW
L.J. 358, 358 (1988).
156. Id.
157. Jury vetting is allowed only in exceptional circumstances, broadly defined as: "(a)
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fence agree[s]."'58
Jury selection is currently based on the principle of random
selection, not on gender, race, or ethnic origin. 5 9 A judge has dis-
cretion to request that a person not serve as a juror when he is
manifestly unsuitable, for example, because he is illiterate. 6° A
judge does not, however, have the discretion to prevent persons
from various sections of the community from serving.
6
1
Mirroring the concerns underlying the Batson case and its
progeny, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Royal
Commission) recommended that the defense or the prosecution
should be able to argue in exceptional cases that the jury should
contain up to three people from ethnic minority communities
162
and that one or more of the three should come from the same
ethnic minority as the defendant or the victim.' 63 The Race Rela-
tions Committee of the General Council of the Bar asked for the
Criminal Bar Association's view. A Criminal Bar Association
Subcommittee issued a report,' 64 which noted that the concept of a
multi-racial jury appeared to be based on the belief that a ran-
domly selected jury could not be relied upon to give a true ver-
dict. 65  The Subcommittee argued that there was no evidence to
substantiate this belief or to show that randomly selected juries
failed to act impartially and without prejudice. 166 In addition, the
cases in which national security is involved and part of the evidence is likely to be heard
in camera, and (b) terrorist cases." Id. at 359.
158. Id. at 358. A colleague defending a recent case that required references to site
plans and documents was in a quandary as to what to do about a blind man on the jury
panel. If he challenged the man for cause, he sensed that it would make other members
of the jury hostile. Consequently, he asked the prosecutor to use his right to stand by to
dismiss the man. The prosecution refused, perhaps sensing the same result or perhaps
strictly following the Attorney General's guidelines. Ultimately, they were both right; the
other jury members assisted the blind man through the documents and elected him as
foreman.
159. See Regina v. Ford, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 762, 765-67.
160. See id.
161. See id. Ford involved a police officer's racial motives. The judge refused to agree
to a multi-racial jury, and an appeal against conviction was dismissed. See id. at 762-63.
162. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2263, 1
222.
163. See id. 223.
164. Criminal Bar Association Sub-Committee, Report on Multi-Racial Juries (1996)
(on file with author).
165. See id. 13.1.
166. See id.
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Royal Commission proposed to adjust jury composition on the
basis of skin color and race, not race alone.'67 The Criminal Bar
Association Subcommittee challenged the assumption that jurors
with different color skin would somehow create the impression of
a fairer trial.' 68 Finally, the Subcommittee wrestled with how to as-
sess a person's skin color, acknowledging that "between the two
extremes of colour there are endless variants."' 69 Eventually, the
Subcommittee concluded that it was sympathetic to the reasoning
that supported the Royal Commission's recommendation, but that
no change should be made to the fundamental principle composing
the heart of the criminal justice system: random jury selection.
17
1
In conclusion, the fears and concerns expressed during the
debate surrounding the abolition of the peremptory challenge
never came to fruition. Challenges for cause did not increase, ju-
rors did not suffer embarrassment due to challenges for cause, and
defendants were not robbed of a sense of justice. Barristers ad-
justed, and many were surprised to discover that their long-held
perception of the perfect jury composition was wrong.71  The
"mystery of the jury system" seems to prevail. The English expe-
rience balanced the importance of cost, speed, intrusion of privacy,
the value of the principle of random selection, and public percep-
tion of justice against the weight of the defendant's sense of fair-
ness and perception of justice. The conclusion seems to be that
other means secure defendants' rights. The days of indictors on a
defendant's jury are long gone, and so too are the days of "rigging
167. Id.
The white South African Boer would not be able to have any juror of the same
race as himself but the black South African would. No Jewish victim of an anti-
semitic attack would have a Jew on the jury but a black victim of a race attack
could have three jurors from a multi-racial background.
Id. 3.2.
168. "The proposition seems to assume that the trial of a West Indian is to be seen as
'fairer' if a Sikh and an Arab are on the jury." Id. 1 3.3.
169. Id. $ 3.5.
How would the Greek or the Oriental be classed, would someone of mixed race
count as half a racially-balanced juror, Who would decide if the native of Mex-
ico was 'black' or 'white.' Any investigation of the individual juror would be
seen as an intrusion into his or her personal background.
Id.
170. See id. 14.1.
171. A common perception was that it was not helpful to the defense to have female
jurors in sex crime cases, but anecdotal evidence now claims the opposite.
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the jury" through peremptory challenges.
IV. REASON AND COMMON SENSE FAVOR ABANDONING
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND RELYING SOLELY UPON
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Both critics and supporters of peremptory challenges agree
that challenges for cause are unrealistically narrow, both in defini-
tion and application.7 2 Under a well-defined and "truly applied"
system of challenges for cause, peremptory challenges would be
neither necessary nor useful in furthering the constitutional guar-
antee of a trial by an impartial jury.
A. Defining Challenges for Cause
Unlike England, the jury selection process in the United
States yields quite a bit of information about potential jurors,
making it much easier for attorneys to formulate challenges for
cause. Each jurisdiction in the United States permits striking a
juror for cause. Some jurisdictions, such as California, Indiana,
Iowa, and Ohio, specifically enumerate "good causes" that justify
striking a juror. Such causes include a juror's relationship to the
defendant, and whether the juror has been or will be a witness in
the case.75 Other jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, take a broader
approach and permit challenges, for example, if a "juror is not im-
partial, whatever the cause of his partiality.'
' 76
Challenges for cause recognized in the various U.S' jurisdic-
tions may be divided into three categories: juror incapacity, actual
172. See discussion supra Part II.E.; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Pow-
ers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation,
41 MD. L. REV. 337,355 (1982); Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a
Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV.
192, 235 n.244 (1978); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235, 243 (1968).
173. When jurors are called to sit on the panel, they are asked to state, among other
things, their occupation, marital status, and education.
174. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-
5 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25
(Banks-Baldwin 1996).
175. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229 (listing 8 challenges for cause); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-1-5 (listing 15 challenges for causp); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (listing 16
challenges for cause); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25 (listing 16 challenges for cause).
176. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 797(2) (West 1996).
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bias or prejudice, and implied bias or prejudice. An ideal scheme
for defining challenges for cause would be similarly divided, hav-
ing as its overarching principle the seating of a jury that can absorb
the presented evidence and that can determine the case in a fair
and impartial manner.
1. Juror Incapacity
Juror incapacity can usually be easily discovered by written
questionnaire or brief voir dire examination. There are two situa-
tions in which a person may be found to be incapacitated as a ju-
ror. The first situation is when he or she cannot perform a juror's
functions. Jurors are disqualified, for example, if they have a
physical or mental disability, 17 7 if they are unable to understand
English, 78 or if they are unable or unwilling to follow the law.
179
The second situation arises when the person fails to meet the statu-
tory criteria for jury service, such as minimum age, 18 citizenship,"'
177. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(5) (1995) ("[i]ncapable, by reason of
physical or mental disability, of rendering satisfactory jury service"); GA. CODE ANN. §
15-12-163(b)(3) (1995) ("that he is incompetent to serve as a juror because of mental ill-
ness or mental retardation, or that he is intoxicated"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(8),
(13) ("[tjhat the person is a mentally incompetent person .... That, from defective sight
or hearing, ignorance of the English language, or other cause, the person is unable to
comprehend the evidence and the instructions of the court"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2,
rule 17 (5)(c) ("[u]nsoundness of mind, or such defects in the faculties of the mind or the
organs of the body as render the juror incapable of performing the duties of a juror");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(2) (1995) ("[i]s incapable by reason of mental or physical
infirmity of rendering jury service"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(H) ("[t]hat he is a
chronic alcoholic, or drug dependent person"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 658(3) (West
1996) ("[u]nsoundness of mind, or such defect in the faculties of the mind or organs of the
body as renders him incapable of performing the duties of a juror"); TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 35.16(a)(4)-(5) (West 1996) ("[tlhat he is insane... [t]hat he has such defect in
the organs of feeling or hearing, or such bodily or mental defect or disease as to render
him unfit for jury service").
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(4); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-
163(b)(6); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(13); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(N);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 658(2).
179. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(3); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
797(4); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.470(2) (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(h)-(i)
(1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(C); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(1).
180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-
163(b)(2); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1996).
181. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-
163(b)(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(9); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(1).
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and absence of felony convictions.8
2. Actual Bias or Prejudice
Similar to juror incapacity, actual bias or prejudice is easily
discovered during voir dire by asking direct questions, such as
"Have you formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant?" Actual bias or prejudice refers to an expressed bias
or prejudice in favor of or against one of the parties. All U.S. ju-
risdictions recognize that actual bias or prejudice constitutes good
cause to challenge a prospective juror. In some jurisdictions, the
relevant statutes merely disqualify "[p]ersons biased or prejudiced
in favor of or against either of the parties."'83 Other jurisdictions'
statutes disqualify potential jurors who have a "formed or ex-
pressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants"'
84
or possess "a state of mind... evincing enmity or bias toward the
defendant or the state."'85
3. Implied Bias or Prejudice
Implied bias or prejudice is the broadest of the three chal-
lenges for cause. The difficulty in determining the existence of
implied bias or prejudice may lead to lengthy juror voir dire. Im-
plied bias or prejudice is found when a juror's relationship or past
experience with the defendant or prosecution would prevent the
juror from impartially judging the evidence or deciding the case
solely upon the presented evidence. While all U.S. jurisdictions
recognize implied bias as a ground for disqualifying jurors, juris-
dictions vary significantly as to the type of relationship or past ex-
perience from which bias may be implied. For example, although
a family relationship to the defendant is commonly recognized as
182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(a)(6); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-
163(b)(5); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, rule 17(5)(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(7);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 658(1); TEX. CODE GRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(2).
183. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-211(4) (West 1995); see also LA. CODE
GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 797(2) ("The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his par-
tiality."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(j); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-35(2) (1992);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(B); TEX. CODE GRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9).
184. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(2); N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW §
270.20(1)(b).
185. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)0) (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(b).
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yielding an implied bias,'86 some jurisdictions imply bias only if the
relationship is within the third degree,87 whereas others extend it
to relationships within the fourth,'8 fifth,' or even sixth' degree.
Other relationships from which bias may be implied include:guardan~wad, 9 .199
guardian-ward,' 9' employer-employee,'92 landlord-tenant, 93 debtor-
creditor,'94 any fiduciary relationship to the defendant, or a person
alleged to have been injured by the defendant.'95 Bias may also be
implied in the following situations: when a juror is related to or is
a client of an attorney involved in the case,196 when a juror has
been an adverse party to the defendant in a civil action 7 or when
the prospective juror has previously served on a jury in a case
arising out of the subject matter of the pending action.' 98
Some jurisdictions recognize grounds for challenges that are
arguably too weak to support a finding of implied bias without
additional facts. For example, Colorado implies bias when a juror
is an attorney or is a compensated employee of a public law en-
186. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229(a) (West Supp. 1996).
187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(b); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
art. 35.16(b)(2). "Degree" refers to the separation in relationship. For example, mother-
daughter is the first degree and grandmother-granddaughter is the second degree.
188. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-211(3); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, rule
17(5)(d) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.470(1) (West 1996).
189. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5(a)(4); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.25(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
190. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(5) (1995).
191. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2,
rule 17(5)(e); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(b) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-
36(2) (1992).
192. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2,
rule 17(5)(e); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-36(2).
193. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2,
rule 17(5)(e); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-36(2).
194. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2,
rule 17(5)(e); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-36(2).
195. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(i).
196. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163(b)(4) (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.470(1)
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(M) (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
197. See, e.g., COLO. REV, STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(d); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, rule
17(f); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(2)(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(4) (1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-17-36(3).
198. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(e); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-
5(a)(5)-(6) (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, rule 17(5)(g)-(j); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 797(5) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-115(d)-(g).
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forcement agency."9 Ohio implies bias when a juror or a juror's
spouse is a party to any pending action that involves an attorney in
the current action.2 ° While some relationships, such as husband-
wife or parent-child, are close enough to justify a finding of im-
plied bias, other relationships are more attenuated and do not
support such a finding. The ultimate test may be whether the re-
lationship between the juror and the party or attorney is such that
the court can reasonably conclude that the relationship would in-
fluence the juror in arriving at a verdict. A distinction needs to be
drawn between factors that may make a juror merely more skepti-
cal toward a particular position and factors that will predispose a
juror to favor one of the parties unwaveringly despite proof of
facts to the contrary. Attorneys must carefully articulate their ba-
sis for implying bias or prejudice in order for the court to deter-
mine whether implied bias or prejudice exists.
B. A Proposed Standard
Of all the state rules and statutes governing challenges for
cause in the United States, Louisiana's Code of Criminal Proce-
dure article 797 comes closest to defining challenges for cause
consistent with the constitutional ideal of impaneling an impartial
jury."1 The Louisiana provision contains five separate subparts,
each directed at disqualifying jurors who cannot serve due to inca-
pacity, bias, or prejudice. 2
The first subpart provides that a juror may be challenged for
cause on the ground that "[t]he juror lacks a qualification required
by law."23 This provision preserves the state's ability to set mini-
mum age, citizenship, physical capacity, and mental capacity re-
quirements, and to eliminate felons from the jury panel. If a pro-
spective juror fails to meet these legislatively mandated standards,
the juror must not be allowed to serve.
The second subpart concerns actual bias and disqualifies a ju-
ror who "is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. ' '204
199. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-103(1)(k).
200. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(K).
201. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 797.
202. See id.
203. Id. art. 797(1).
204., Id. art. 797(2).
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Significantly, the statute further provides: "An opinion or impres-
sion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself
be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the
court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according
to the law and the evidence. 20 5 Thus, an opinion on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant is not sufficient to support a challenge
for cause. The court must inquire further to ascertain the firmness
of the prospective juror's opinion. The guiding principle is the
constitutionally mandated provision of an impartial jury, which
would require exclusion of jurors who have well-settled opinions
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The third subpart addresses implied bias by approving a chal-
lenge for cause when "[t]he relationship, whether by blood, mar-
riage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and
the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attor-
ney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude
that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict."206 The
mere existence of a relationship is not sufficient to support a chal-
lenge for cause. Rather, the court must undertake an inquiry suf-
ficient to determine whether the relationship will "influence the
juror in arriving at a verdict." Similar to the second subpart, the
goal is the constitutionally mandated provision of an impartial
jury.
The statute's final two subparts set forth grounds for challeng-
ing a juror for cause that appear to be more absolute than the ac-
tual bias and implied bias provisions. The fourth subpart provides
for disqualifying a juror who "will not accept the law as given to
him by the court. '" 207 Obviously, a juror who has indicated that he
or she will not follow the court's instructions cannot be qualified to
serve on a jury, and no additional inquiry is needed.
Finally, the fifth subpart provides that a "juror [who] served
on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that
once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense" may
be challenged for cause.28 The concern of this subpart is that the
juror may possess information that will not be presented to the
205. Id.
206. Id. art. 797(3).
207. Id. art. 797(4).
208. Id. art. 797(5).
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jury, possibly because it is inadmissible, but that the juror may im-
properly rely upon and communicate to other jurors in the course
of deliberation. Similar to the fourth subpart, disqualification of
jurors under this provision appears absolute, and no additional in-
quiry is needed. It would be wise, however, to expand this ground
for cause to include prospective witnesses in the action and others
with first-hand knowledge of the facts involved in the case.
In conclusion, a clear definition of cause is needed. Similar to
Louisiana's statute, the definition must absolutely disqualify jurors
who fail to meet statutory criteria, who refuse to follow the law,
and who have previously sat in judgment of the defendant or have
first-hand knowledge of the facts involved in the action. In addi-
tion, the definition must provide for a challenge based upon actual
or implied bias or prejudice that requires an inquiry focused upon
juror impartiality. As the Louisiana statute implicitly recognizes,
facts suggesting the existence of bias or prejudice, actual or im-
plied, do not necessarily mean that a juror cannot be impartial.
Rather, attorneys must be able to convince the court of specific
reasons why a juror cannot be impartial in order to dismiss the ju-
ror for cause.
C. The Court's Ruling on Challenges for Cause Must Be
Reviewable
Unlike peremptory challenges, challenges for cause are inef-
fective to remove jurors unless the court finds that cause exists to
remove a juror. Although'the existence of peremptory challenges
effectively renders judicial decisions on challenges for cause unre-
viewable, 209 abolishing peremptory challenges would not prohibit
review of the denial of challenges for cause.
As noted previously, challenges for cause must be made with
the constitutionally mandated goal of seating an impartial jury.
The only way that attorneys will be able to strike unqualified, bi-
ased, or prejudiced jurors is by exercising the challenge for cause.
Therefore, failure to permit appellate review of the denial of a
challenge for cause would eviscerate the guarantee of a trial by an
impartial jury.
209. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many commentators have debated the merits and shortcom-
ings of the jury selection process, but few have discussed an obvi-
ous solution: if challenges for cause were clearly defined and vig-
orously applied, there would be no need for peremptory challenges
and all of their unsavory baggage. If an attorney is unable to ar-
ticulate why a person is unfit to be seated on the jury, based on
logical substantive reasoning, then the person should be allowed to
serve on the jury.
If the U.S. system relied upon challenges for cause, sensibly
and fairly administered, and abandoned peremptory challenges as
wasteful sorcery promoting unjust discrimination, the United
States would come much closer to selecting fair and impartial ju-
ries. Although all bias may not be identified and eliminated,"' the
focus of jury selection must be shifted away from the use of
hunches, prejudices, and preconceptions in order to obtain a
"favorable" jury. It must move toward reliance upon the ability of
attorneys to discern and articulate their grounds for exercising
challenges for cause and reliance upon a neutral court to rule care-
fully upon those challenges. Only then can the United States ex-
pect to assemble the fair and impartial juries that the Constitution
guarantees.
210. Under both the current system and the proposed system, a truly biased juror may
deceive the parties and be seated on a jury. Additionally, most people have some predis-
positions toward or against one party's position. It is the job of the trial attorney, by ef-
fective presentation of evidence, to overcome those predispositions.
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